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NOTES
fore, it seems that the only logical interpretation of the article is
that the drafters of the Code intended to omit that requirement.
If an additional argument is needed, a review of the decisions
under the old statute2 0 will lend force to the above interpretation
of the new Article 92.
B.R.D.
INSURANCE-OPTIONAL RIGHT OF INSURER UNDER THE LOUISIANA
NON-FORFEITURE STATUTE--Action by beneficiary to recover face
value of a policy which lapsed due to nonpayment of premiums
after being in existence for more than three years. The policy
contained a stipulation providing for automatic paid-up insurance
in the event of lapse for nonpayment of premiums. Defendant
contends that in accordance with the authority granted it by Act
57 of 1932, and because of a stipulation contained in the policy
providing for automatic paid-up insurance in the event of lapse
for nonpayment of premiums, the maximum amount of defend-
ant's liability was the paid-up insurance value of said policy.
Held, the insurer cannot insert in their policies conditions requir-
ing the insured to exercise his option before the policy lapses.
The insurer's right granted by statute to apply the reserve fund
is a conditional right. The policy not having granted the insured
an option as required by Act 193 of 1906, as amended by Act 57
of 1932, the secondary optional right of the insurer never came
into existence. Edwards v. National Life & Accident Insurance
Company, Incorporated, 11 So. (2d) 125 (La. 1942).
"The delinquent policyholder has no inherent right to the
reserve value of his policy. . . .Hence any claim made by the
insured to paid-up or extended insurance must necessarily be
based upon an agreement or a statute according to him such a
right."' Statutes giving the insured certain rights to the reserve
for the purpose of this note will be classified into five categories.
First, the minority group of non-forfeiture statutes provide that
in the event of a default in payment of premiums, the reserve
shall be applied in the one form which is stipulated in the stat-
ute.2 The better constructed non-forfeiture statutes compose the
20. State v. Ramey, 173 La. 478, 137 So. 859 (1931); State v. Lewis, 183 La.
823, 165 So. 1 (1935).
1. Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance (2 ed. 1930) 302, § 88.
2. Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) 998, § 133, provides that, on forfeiture of a life
policy for nonpayment of premiums after it has been in force three full
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second category. These give the insured an option, state the term
within which insured must exercise this option, and specify the
procedure the insured must follow in exercising it5 The third
group of statutes grant the insured an option and specify the term
within which he must exercise it, but do not stipulate the proce-
dure he must follow in exercising the option.4 The Louisiana non-
forfeiture statute as originally drafted exemplifies a fourth group
of statutes. These grant the insured an option and stipulate the
procedure he must follow in exercising his option, but do not
specify the term within which he must exercise this option. In
the fifth category are the statutes which merely provide that the
insured has an option, but do not state the term within which
he must exercise his option nor the procedure he must follow
in exercising the option.6 Although the statutes in the second,
third, fourth, and fifth categories differ in certain particulars,
they are unanimous in granting the insured an option, and in
years, the reserve shall be considered as a net single premium of temporary
insurance and applied to the purchase of such insurance.
3. N.Y. Insurance Law (McKinney's Consol. Laws) § 208, provides in the
event of default in payment of a premium after three full years' premiums
have been paid, the insurance company, upon surrender of such policy within
three months from the due date of the payment in default shall pay to the
person thereto a cash surrender value. The person entitled to such cash sur-
render value may, upon demand, therefore, within three months elect to
receive in lieu of cash surrender value, either extended term insurance or
reduced paid-up insurance. If no other option be selected within three months
after the due date of the premium in default, the amount of such non-for-
feiture value shall be applied to continue the insurance in force as extended
term insurance.
4. Mo. Stat. Ann. (1932) § 5741 provides that after three annual payments
a policy shall not become void by reason of nonpayment of premiums, but
the reserve shall be taken as the net single premium for temporary insur-
ance. Section 5742 provides that the legal holder of the policy may demand a
paid-up policy, not later than sixty days from beginning of the extended in-
surance.
5. La. Act 193 of 1906, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4115] declares that every
life or endowment policy shall contain a stipulation that after three full
annual premiums have been paid, it shall not be forfeited for nonpayment
of any premium thereafter and that it is issued subject to provisions of this
act. Section 2 provides that, where such a policy lapses, the reserve shall
upon demand with surrender of the policy be applied as a surrender value as
agreed upon in the policy, provided that if no other option expressed in the
policy be availed of by the owner of the policy, the same without any further
act on the part of the owner shall be applied to continue the insurance in
force at its full amount, so long as such surrender value will purchase tem-
porary insurance. This section further provides that any attempted waiver
of these provisions shall be void.
6. Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 87, § 65, provides that after three full
years of premiums have been paid, in the event of default of the payment of
premiums, there shall be secured to the insured either paid-up insurance or
extended insurance. The section also provides for cash surrender value.
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providing for the application of the reserve, if the insured does
not exercise his option.7
Louisiana Act 57 of 19328 amending and re-enacting Section 2
of Louisiana Act 193 of 1906 reads identically the same as the 1906
act except for one change. The 1932 act 9 purports to give the in-
surer an option if the insured fails to exercise his option, whereas
the 1906 act made the election ° for the insured if he failed to
exercise his option.
The Louisiana courts have never stated precisely when the
insurer has a right to make a choice. They have excluded the in-
surer's option, basing their decisions on the settled point that the
insured's option cannot be waived by stipulations in the policy
making the election." The majority decisions of other jurisdic-
tions are in accord.1 2
The statute places the insurer in a position of possessing a
choice, knowing what he may choose from, but not knowing
when he has a right to make his choice. The court in the Edwards
case stated that the option is a conditional one; conditioned "upon
the failure of the owner to avail himself of an express option after
the policy lapsed." It seems to follow from this -rule that if the
policy states categorically how the reserve fund is to be applied,
it is elemental that it has failed to provide the primary right, that
is, an express option, and -therefore the conditional or secondary
right of the insurer to apply the reserve can never come into ex-
istence; consequently the question is-when may the insured
exercise his option? Since the right of the insurer is conditional
upon the failure of the insured to exercise his option, the insurer's
7. Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 87, § 65; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) 998, §
133; N.Y. Insurance Law (McKinney's Consol. Laws) § 208.
8. La. Act 193 of 1906, § 2, as last amended by La. Act 57 of 1932, § 1,
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4116].
9. Ibid. This act provided that if no other option be availed of by the
owner, the reserve, without any further act on the part of the owner of the
policy, shall be applied either to purchase paid-up insurance, or to continue
the insurance in force at its full amount.
10. La. Act 193 of 1906 provided that if no other option be availed of by
the owner, the reserve, without any further act on the part of the owner of
the policy shall be applied to continue the insurance in force at its full
amount.
11. Crump v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 183 La. 55, 162 So. 800 (1935);
Cryer v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., Inc., 183 La. 67, 162 So. 804 (1935);
Succession of Watson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 183 La. 25, 162 So. 790
(1935); Williams v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., Inc., 183 La. 64, 162 So.
803 (1935); Furlong v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 185 La.
352, 169 So. 431, 106 A.L.R. 40 (1936); Cruze v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 184
So. 735 (La. App. 1938); Dominique v. Liberty Industrial Life Ins. Co., 192 So.
110 (La. App. 1939); Parretti v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 196 So. 663 (La.
App. 1940).
12. 26 A.L.R. 103 (1923), supplemented by 115 A.L.R. 1389 (1938).
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optional right comes into existence when the insured has failed
to exercise his choice. The question then is when has the insured
failed to exercise his option. The Louisiana non-forfeiture statute
does not specify the term within which the insured must make
his election. However, when the issue becomes pertinent, the
Louisiana courts will probably follow the general rule that when
no time limit for the exercise of an option is fixed by the contract
or statute, the right to exercise it expires after the passage of a
reasonable time" and what constitutes a reasonable time must be
determined by the circumstances of each case."4 Once it has been
determined that the conditional option has come into existence
the language of the statute "without any further act on the part
of the owner of the policy" infers that the insurer may exercise
his option without any hesitation or notification to the insured.
In order to be more certain that they will be allowed to exer-
cise their option in the event the insured fails to exercise his,
the insurance companies should be careful to omit any clauses in
policies issued in Louisiana which the court might interpret as a
waiver of the insured's right to an option at the time the policy
lapses. Since it is a settled rule of contract law that parties may
agree upon what constitutes a reasonable time, it might be wise
for insurance companies to insert a term provision in their poli-
cies to the effect that sixty days after the lapse of the policy the
insurer will exercise his right to apply the reserve fund in one of
two ways. However, particularly in a hard fact case, the court
might decide that the sixty day clause is a restriction or delimi-
tation on the insured's right. A lengthy stride might be taken by
the Louisiana legislature toward settling the uncertainties which
exist in the Louisiana non-forfeiture statute and relieving our
courts of numerous, costly controversies by following the ex-
amples of the majority of jurisdictions and inserting a time limit
clause stipulating when the insured's option terminates.
J. C. T., Jr.
NEGLIGENCE-SCOPE OF TORTFEASORS LIABILITY--ON PREGNANCY
AND OTHER PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS-Plaintiff had stopped her
car at an intersection in obedience to a traffic signal. While in this
stationary position the automobile was run into from the rear by
a truck owned by the defendant company and driven by one of
13. 3 Couch, Encyclopedia of Insurance Law (1929) 2078-2079, § 641a.
Marti v. Midwest Life Ins. Co., 108 Neb. 845, 189 N.W. 388, 29 A.L.R. 1507
(1922).
14. 4 Cooley, Briefs on the Law of Insurance (2 ed. 1927) 3815, c. 14.
[Vol. V
